While we focus on advertising and marketing issues in this blog, we occasionally stray into competition law topics when we think they will be of interest to our readers, particularly when they relate to whether and how a manufacturer can dictate or influence the downstream pricing decisions of distributors or retailers.
In the US, vertical pricing agreements are generally subject to the rule-of-reason after the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin -- or in other words they will be examined to determine if the overall effects can be said to harm competition rather than forbid such arrangements outright as per se unlawful like horizontal price fixing between competitors. In some states, minimum resale price maintenance (“You will charge no less than X”) is still per se unlawful and various bills have been introduced at the federal level to overturn the Leegin holding. Competition laws are not one size fits all from a worldwide perspective. While most countries scratch their heads and refrain from me-tooing the US Robinson Patman, or price discrimination, law, many other countries still outright frown on vertical pricing restraints.
In the EU, vertical price fixing is considered to be a “hardcore” restraint (essentially one that almost always raises significant competition issues) unless the parties to such an agreement can demonstrate that the provision will result in efficiencies that outweigh harm to competition. The European Commission has limited examples of this to situations where resale price maintenance is necessary for a short period of time to facilitate entry of a new product into a market or to prevent free riding, and a relaxing of the EU approach to resale price maintenance is not anticipated.
In 2003, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) opened an investigation into retail tobacco product pricing practices as the result of a leniency application made under the OFT’s leniency program. The OFT issued its statement of objections in 2008, after which six companies entered into agreements settling the OFT’s allegations. In April 2010, the OFT adopted a decision finding that agreements Imperial Tobacco and Gallaher entered into with retailers had the object of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition for the supply of tobacco products and imposing £225 million in fines. The OFT found that these agreements restricted the retailers’ ability to set its own retail prices by mandating “parity and differential requirements” between the manufacturer’s brands and its competitor’s brands. For example, an agreement might provide that manufacturer’s Brand X must be “no more expensive than” or “not more than 3 pence more expensive than” competitor’s Brand Y.
Imperial and five retailers appealed the OFT’s decision to the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), which set aside the OFT’s decision as it relates to the appellants. During the proceedings before the CAT, which can hear testimony, the evidence did not support the OFT’s interpretation of the agreements. As a result, the OFT attempted to change its theory of harm. In short, the OFT argued that no matter how a parity and differential pricing strategy was implemented, it restricted competition by restricting the retailer’s ability to set prices. In a December 12 opinion, the CAT concluded that the OFT’s new theory was not a part of its original decision and the CAT therefore did not have jurisdiction to consider it. The CAT went on to find that even if it had jurisdiction, it would exercise its discretion not to continue hearing the appeals. The decision of the CAT does not mean that the OFT’s original theory of harm would not have been valid had the evidence relied on by the OFT supported that theory. However, it is yet another significant blow to the OFT’s enforcement activities which have been plagued by a series of high profile failures in the last few years. It is not anticipated that the OFT will seek to re-open the case based on the revised theory of harm.